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In this model of education, where individuals are exposed both to educational risk and to 
wage risk within the skilled sector, successful graduation depends both on individual effort to 
study and on public resources. We show that insuring the present risks is a dichotomic task: 
Wage risk is diversified ex post among the skilled by graduate taxation and skill-specific 
tuition fees. Educational risk of failure and inequality between skilled and unskilled workers 
are mitigated ex ante by enhancing the quality of education. The necessary expenditures are 
optimally financed by regressive tuition fees and the net revenue from the graduate tax. 
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This paper deals with educational and wage risks and characterizes optimal edu-
cational and tax policies to mitigate the effects of wage inequality and skill-biased
technological change. Optimal educational policies thereby include regressive (ex
ante) tuition fees and graduate taxation as well as public real investment in order
to foster the quality of educational institutions (e.g., universities).
At least in the last 20 years, one observes an increasing wage inequality in
nearby all developed countries. On the one hand, the wage gap between skilled
and unskilled workers is rising and on the other hand there are wage differen-
tials across industries within the skilled sector. These trends in wages are mainly
driven by ongoing globalization of the world economy and by skill-biased tech-
nological change.1 Jacobs (2004) forecasts the wage gap between skilled and
unskilled wages to be widening even more, due to a higher growth rate in skilled
labor demand relative to skilled labor supply. Skill-biased technological progress
does, however, not only harm unskilled workers, it also affects the utilization and
depreciation of human capital in different industries in different ways (see, e.g.,
Wildasin, 2000). This leads to wage uncertainty in the skilled sector and ﬁts to
the Mincer (1974)-view of education and human capital investment increasing
risk. The results by Mincer (1974) are renewed and backed, e.g., by Carneiro
et al. (2003), examining high-school and college graduates and showing the over-
whelming part of variance in returns to education to be unpredictable by students
at the time of investment.
Taken together, these wage inequalities correspond to educational risk (risk of
failure to enter the skilled sector) and to wage risk within the skilled sector, be-
cause ex ante it is uncertain which kind of employment one will ﬁnd. The main
difference between these kinds of risk is that for educational risk households and
the government determine the probability distribution endogenously by choosing
learning effort and educational quality. Hence, ex ante insurance by increasing the
success probability (i.e., the quality of education) is possible. This ﬁts to regard-
ing the education system as a ‘ﬁlter technology’ producing ex post heterogeneity
1See, e.g., Krugman (1995) and Katz and Autor (1999). Another reason for observed wage
inequality is seen in increasing educational wage differentials.
1and calling for redistribution, even if the playing ﬁeld is level by full access to
education, i.e., if households are homogenous ex ante or if there is equality of
opportunities in case of ex ante heterogeneity, see Konrad (2004). For wage risk
instead, only the ex post exposure to risk can be affected, but the entry probabil-
ity for each state of nature is exogenous. In a risk- and inequality-averse society,
these two kinds of risk do not only cause inefﬁcient investment in education,2 but
also give raise to redistributive motives between winners and looser. As private
insurance markets seem not to work (see Sinn, 1996) due to, e.g., adverse selec-
tion – the good risks are opting out – and legal limitations (students are too young
for writing binding contracts), this calls for governmental intervention.
However, what can be done? Is it sufﬁcient to increase population’s acquire-
ment of higher education and human capital, as proposed by the EU ‘Lisbon-
agenda’ (EU-Council, 2005)? How should this be ﬁnanced? What happens, if
risk of failure and of ending up as unskilled worker is weighed against wage risk
of skilled workers? Are ex post income transfers another, a better or an additional
way of insurance?
We show that the welfare maximizing governmental revenue policy is char-
acterized by (i) a graduate tax on skilled earned income, (ii) a general lump-sum
tax, which can be seen as general tuition fees paid by all households and (iii)
by skilled-speciﬁc tuition fees, turning most likely into education subsidies to
successful students and creating, consequently, a regressive structure of ‘front-
loaded’ tuition fees. A general labor tax is not used. Unskilled workers are net tax
payers and tax revenue is spent on investments to enhance the quality of educa-
tion in order to increase the success probability in educational investment for all
households. This provides ex ante insurance and mitigates distortions in learning
effort, created by taxation.
These results are derived in a two-period model, where the individuals ﬁrst
decide on their learning effort. This determines their success probability in higher
education. At the end of the ﬁrst period, success risk in education and an industry-
speciﬁc productivity shock in the skilled sector realize. The latter shock can be
seen as technological change, affecting utilization of human capital differently
2See Levhari and Weiss (1974), who are the ﬁrst in analyzing these topics, but also Kodde
(1986, 1988).
2across industries. At the beginning of the second period, the individuals observe
in which sector respectively in which industry within the skilled sector they will
be employed and choose their sector-contingent labor supply. The benevolent
government can use a proportional wage tax on all incomes, a graduate tax (being
paid only by skilled workers) and skill-speciﬁc tuition fees in order to ﬁnance
both a general lump-sum transfer and public funding of the education system.
Public educational spending is assumed to increase the success probability by
enhancing the quality in the educational sector and therefore by enhancing the
‘ﬁlter technology.’
The proceeding is as follows: In the next section, we provide a short overview
on related literature. The model is presented in section 3. Then, we characterize
optimal household behavior in section 4 and describe public policy in section 5. In
section 6, ﬁnally, optimal usage of tax instruments and optimal public investment
are derived. Section 7 concludes.
2 Relationship to the Literature
There is some literature on optimal tax policy in case of risky human capital in-
vestment and wage uncertainty. This paper combines and extends two strands:
First, there are models focusing on (pure) wage risk (within one sector), second
there are models dealing with success risk in education and the wage differential
between a skilled and an unskilled sector.
It is well known from the seminal paper series by Eaton and Rosen (1980a,b)
that it is optimal to implement a distorting wage tax, because the insurance pro-
videdwill outweigh the excessburden, if wageincome is subject to (idiosyncratic)
risk. Hamilton (1987) conﬁrms this result and extends their model for capital
income taxation as indirect education policy. He argues that remaining underin-
vestment in education is inefﬁcient and calls for education subsidies. In a related
setting, Anderberg and Andersson (2003) show that education itself can have an
insurance effect, if the government centrally decides on educational investment
and that it should be overprovided in this case, because this increases both welfare
and tax revenue.
Other recent papers, dealing with risky human capital formation and risky
3skilled labor income, are, e.g., García-Peñalosa and Wälde (2000), da Costa and
Maestri (2007), Jacobs and van Wijnbergen (2007), Schindler and Yang (2007),
and Anderberg (2008). Basically, all these contributions show that a graduate
tax (respectively progressive income taxation), accompanied by some direct ed-
ucation subsidies, is optimal in order to insure individuals against income risks.
Education subsidies then mitigate tax-induced distortions. The basic mechanism
at work is thereby highly related to models of education and optimal redistribution
among ex ante heterogenous individuals in deterministic worlds, see, among oth-
ers, Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005), Jacobs and Bovenberg (2008), and Maldonado
(2008).
Common to all these papers on wage risk is that they treat income risk as ex-
ogenous. There is no choice on learning effort, and therefore no effect of taxation
on the probability distribution itself. This feature is illuminated in models focus-
ing on the risk of failure (in education), which distinguish, therefore, two sectors:
a skilled and an unskilled one.
Wigger and von Weizsäcker (2001) examine the case of ex ante and ex post
moral hazard in such a setting and analyze different public policies. However,
they restrict to two possible effort levels and the government cannot inﬂuence
the learning technology by public educational spending. Andersson and Konrad
(2003a,b) deal with endogenous learning effort in a risky setting as well and apply
a two-period model, which is also the baseline of our approach. They focus on
possible private insurance instead of governmental instruments (Andersson and
Konrad, 2003a) as well as on hold-up problems and time-consistent taxation in
case of a Leviathan government (Andersson and Konrad, 2003b). However, they
do neither consider direct public spending in the educational sector nor endoge-
nous labor supply in the working period. Accordingly, they are not able to deal
with the issue of whether providing insurance against educational (failure) risk ex
ante by enhancing the quality of education, i.e., by increasing the success proba-
bility, or ex post by granting income transfers.
This is done in Schindler and Weigert (2008), being mostly related to our
modeling approach. They compare the First-best equilibrium to a Second-best
optimum and show that, in the Second-best, quality of education becomes more
4important than income transfers.3 Therefore, the government applies both general
and skill-speciﬁc tuition fees, as well as public real investment in the educational
sector. Unskilled workers are net tax payers, but labor taxes are not used.
The present paper, now, signiﬁcantly extends the scope: wage risk in an het-
erogenous skilled sector is introduced as technological change and the instruments
of the government are increased by a graduate tax. This combines the two strands
of the literature described above and tackles the questions, how to insure against
multiple risk, what the optimal overall tax burden on skilled labor income should
be, if any, and how the optimal combination of ex ante tuition fees and ex post
fees, being proportional to income via graduate taxation, can be characterized.
3 The Model
We assume individuals of each generation living for two periods. In this over-
lapping generations model, each individual bears one child at the beginning of its
second period of life and dies at the end of this period. Thus, there is no popu-
lation growth. Moreover, we assume the mass of each cohort being normalized
to one. During their life, individuals have to allocate one unit of time in each
period. Assuming implicitly that individuals have already attended compulsory
schooling, they spent their time on higher education by choosing their time effort
e 2 [0;1] devoted to learning, and on leisure in their ﬁrst period, l1 = 1¡e. In the
second period, individuals start working and allocate time to their individual labor
supply. As both education in the ﬁrst period and working in the second period are
time consuming activities, they generate disutility. Therefore, the fundamental
structure of the model follows the tradition of Glomm and Ravikumar (1992).
However, individuals are exposed to two different kinds of risk: First, attend-
ing university does not guarantee an employment as skilled worker. Second, in
case of skilled workers, their wage depends on an independently and idiosyncrat-
ically distributed stochastic factor µ, which mirrors different productivities across
3Note that in Schindler and Weigert (2008) the term ‘improving educational opportunities’ is
applied for increasing the success probability in education. We are now using ‘enhancing the
quality of education’ in order to avoid any confusion with respect to the concept of ‘equality of
opportunities’, which is not relevant for our topic and not related to our approach.
5industries in the skilled sector, being revealed only on the job and being driven
by industry-speciﬁc technological shocks. These shocks affect the utilization and
depreciation of human capital differently.4 Households might, therefore, differ in
their innate abilities to cope with such technological shocks, however, this hetero-
geneity neither affects their success probability in the education process nor is the
ability revealed before ﬁnding a job in the skilled sector. Thus, we can focus on a
representative household.
The probability p to pass the educational process successfully and to acquire
a degree as skilled worker is determined by the effort invested into education e
and the endowment of the educational system E. This probability represents the
quality of education, which the educational system provides. We assume the prob-
ability function p(e;E) to be a concave function of learning effort, thus e has a
positive, but diminishing marginal productivity. This ﬁts the stylized facts that
higher education increases the probability of being employed, whilst unemploy-
ment is mostly concentrated among the unskilled (see, e.g., OECD (2007, Indica-
tor A8)). Endowment E is measured by public funding of the educational sector
and is assumed to affect the quality of education positively, e.g., by increasing the
number of professors and decreasing the ratio of students per teacher. Further-
more, private effort and public funding are assumed being complements, whereby
an increase in public funding also increases the marginal productivity of each time
unit invested. Thus, we have5
p = p(e;E) 2 [0;1); (1)
where p(0;E) = 0, and
@p
@e = pe > 0;
@p






@e@E = peE >
0.
If an individual successfully graduates and enters the skilled sector, it will
supply skilled labor instead of being employed as unskilled worker. Each graduate
4An alternative interpretation of the stochastic factor µ can be individual luck in ﬁnal exams.
This would follow the view that ﬁnal grades are used by employers as indicator for real productiv-
ity of the graduate and therefore determine wage offers.
5This speciﬁcation neglects private investment into the endowment of the educational system.
This is a strong assumption. Incorporating this item would add much complexity to the analysis,
but should not change the qualitative results as long as there is no perfect crowding out in private
and public resource investment.
6is supplied with one unit of human capital, but its effective labor supply depends
on a stochastic factor µ as well. µ 2 [wL=wH;1) gives rise for idiosyncratic wage
risk, then. This mirrors the fact that human capital can be utilized differently,
dependent on the kind of job. This corresponds to individual uncertainty about
productivity in different jobs, to differences in the ability to cope with industry-
speciﬁc technological change and to the luck to get well-paid job openings.6
For sake of simpliﬁcation, we assume that the stock of human capital is inde-
pendent of learning effort e. In principle, a human capital production function F H
should also depend on effort and endowment, consequently F H = F H(e;E;µ)
with F H
j > 0, F H
jj < 0, j = e;E. Admittedly, the reduced version F H(µ) = µ
is sufﬁcient in order to concentrate on the issues of educational and wage risk,
because endogenous labor supply will capture most of the neglected effects and
most of the results presented later would not change qualitatively by using a more
sophisticated human capital production – but the analysis itself would become
much more complicated.
Wage risk realizes at the beginning of the second period, and all graduates start
working as skilled workers afterwards, supplying µi ¢Hi units of effective labor in
industry i. Those who fail to enter the skilled labor market are not faced by any
wage risk and supply L units of labor as unskilled workers. In the second period
individuals are endowed with one divisible unit of time, accordingly time 1 ¡ Hi,
respectively 1 ¡ L, is consumed as second-period leisure. Total wage income is
spent on total family consumption.
It is important to distinguish between educational and wage risk, because they
signiﬁcantly differ in the ways to insure against. The former kind of risk im-
plies that households choose their probability for entering the skilled sector op-
timally, and consequently, the probability distribution is endogenized. Then, the
government can provide ex ante insurance by increasing the success probability
via public investment. This can be seen as enhancing the quality of education,
i.e., improving the efﬁciency of the education system as a ﬁlter technology and
allowing more students to pass on into the skilled sector, see Konrad (2004). Note
6Again, an another explanation can be that salaries depend to some extent on grades in ﬁnal
exams. Thus, salaries depend also on individual fate (or the individual risk of a bad hair day) in
these exams.
7that this is important even if the playing ﬁeld is leveled or if the individuals are
homogenous ex ante, e.g., with respect to ability. Contrary to standard models,
relying on wage risk and decentralized decision making with respect to educa-
tional investment, governmental spending in the education sector or subsidization
of education has accordingly a direct insurance effect here.
The latter kind of risk also allows to adjust the exposure to risk by educational
investment by households and income redistribution by the government. How-
ever, the distribution of entry probabilities for the possible states of nature is ex-
ogenously given, educational policy does not provide any insurance effect and ex
post insurance (e.g., by taxation) is the only social insurance device. The present
model enables us to analyze both the interplay of these risks and the optimal social
insurance mix.
Social insurance is desirable, because it will be assumed throughout the paper
that private insurance is not available – neither against educational risk nor against
wage risk. This might be because of market failure due to adverse selection and
moral hazard and the fact that human capital cannot serve as collateral, see, e.g.,
Eaton and Rosen (1980b), or the fact that individuals are too young to write insur-
ance contracts, when they decide on their human capital investment (Sinn, 1996).7
All individuals have identical preferences which are deﬁned over leisure in
period one and two, l1 and l2, and over total family consumption C in period
two. Formally, the preferences are described by a von Neumann-Morgenstern
expected utility function which is additively separable in its intertemporal compo-
nents. Thus, we have
E[U] = U1(1¡e)+p(e;E)¢E[U2(CHi;1¡Hi)]+[1¡p(e;E)]¢U2(CL;1¡L); (2)
where Hi = 1 ¡ l2Hi denotes second period labor supplied by a skilled worker
of type i, whose human capital realized as µi. Accordingly, L = 1 ¡ l2L denotes
labor supplied by an unskilled worker in the second period.8 In order to ensure
an interior solution, especially for learning effort e = 1 ¡ l1, we assume that the
7These arguments are in the major line of the literature. An opposing view and some discussion
of this assumption is to be found in Andersson and Konrad (2003a).
8Subscripts H and L denote the respective values for the different skill groups, subscript i
indicates the realization of wage risk µ for a skilled worker.
8utility function meets the following Inada conditions:





























= 0 j = 1;2:
(Nominal) Wages for both skill groups are exogenously given and denoted
by wH and wL respectively. This ﬁts to assuming a small open economy. The
government can apply a broad set of policy instruments: First, there is a linear
income tax scheme consisting of a constant tax rate t and a lump-sum transfer T.
The lump-sum transfer can turn negative and will be interpreted as general tuition
fee, if T < 0. Second, skilled workers are liable to a proportional surtax, where
their income is additionally taxed at rate tH. This fulﬁlls the deﬁnition of a grad-
uate tax (see. e.g., Jacobs (2002, Section 2)), where repayments are proportional
to earned income, but independent of the initial subsidy/loan received and where
they can exceed this amount substantially (or remain less, accordingly providing
even better insurance).9 Third, successfully entering the skilled sector is subject to
skill-speciﬁc tuition fees fB. These fees can be motivated as follows: Assume that
the government collects tuition fees from each student entering university, but at
the same time pre-ﬁnances these fees by granting a compulsory public credit fB.
This credit has to be repaid after successful graduation and entering the skilled
sector. Consequently, there are no real payments in the ﬁrst period of life and
the repayment in the second period is settled in terms of a skill-contingent loan.
Only households, which successfully entered the skilled sector have to pay the
ﬁxed amount fB. Note that we do not require the tuition fees to cover all public
expenses for higher education. Instead, the government can use a mix of instru-
ments to ﬁnance higher education.
Put together, we apply de facto a full set of skill speciﬁc taxes. Combin-
ing the tax instruments described above, and assuming concomitant adjustment
9In fact, a graduate tax can be seen as an equity stake of the government in human capital of
graduates. See Jacobs and van Wijnbergen (2007).
9where necessary, there is a skill-speciﬁc wage tax on unskilled labor supply at rate
tU = t, whereas labor income of skilled workers is liable to a skill-speciﬁc wage
tax at rate tS = t + tH. Moreover, there are two skill-speciﬁc per-capita transfers
or poll taxes: unskilled workers receive a transfer T U = T, whereas skilled work-
ers are faced by skill-speciﬁc net payments of T S = fB ¡T. For these taxes to be
implemented, the government does not need to know individual wages or hours
worked, but observes total wage income and it knows whether a worker is em-
ployed in the skilled or the unskilled sector. The latter is a strong assumption, as
this informational requirement is necessary to avoid moral hazard behavior. There
might be a strong incentive to mimic an unskilled worker, if the skill status were
private information. Note that this set of instruments does not allow to implement
a First-best solution, because learning effort cannot be controlled. Dealing with
the resulting moral hazard problem in educational investment will be one of the
main tasks of this paper.
The budget constraint of a skilled household i can then be written as
CHi = (1 ¡ t ¡ t
H) ¢ wH ¢ µi ¢ Hi ¡ fB + T; (3)
whereas consumption of an unskilled household is given by
CL = (1 ¡ t) ¢ wL ¢ L + T: (4)
Both kinds of risk being present in the economy are idiosyncratic. Accordingly,
there are ex post p(e;E) skilled workers and 1 ¡ p(e;E) unskilled ones in each
generation. Total labor supply of the skilled workers is given by p(e;E) ¢ E[µi ¢
Hi]. The government uses its instruments in order to maximize the utility of a
representative steady-state generation. The government thereby faces a trade-off
between efﬁcient ﬁnancing of public expenditure and optimal insurance against
the risks of education. The latter implies on the one hand redistribution between
successful and unsuccessful students and on the other hand redistribution between
lucky and unlucky skilled workers.
Inanutshell, thetimingstructureandthemodelcanbesummarizedasfollows:
First, the benevolent government decides on public funding of the educational
10sector and on the tax instruments.10 Second, the young generation will choose
learning effort given wages, the probability distribution of µ and the governmental
decisions. This in turn determines the success probability p(e;E), and with it the
fraction of skilled and unskilled workers. At the beginning of the second period
wage risk µ realizes and each individual knows both whether it graduated or failed
and which effective wage it will earn. Based on this knowledge, it then decides on
its labor supply. In the following, we will solve the model by backward induction.
4 Household Behavior
The decision problem of a representative household is given by:
max
fe;Hi;CHi;L;CLg
E[U] = U1(1 ¡ e) + p(e;E) ¢ E[U2(CHi;1 ¡ Hi)]
+ [1 ¡ p(e;E)] ¢ U2(CL;1 ¡ L) s.t. (3) and (4) (5)
Substituting (3) and (4) into (5) then yields the following ﬁrst order conditions:
@E[U]
@Hi
= U2C(CHi;1 ¡ Hi) ¢ (1 ¡ t ¡ t
H)wHµi ¡ U2l2(CHi;1 ¡ Hi) = 0; (6)
@E[U]
@L
= U2C(CL;1 ¡ L) ¢ (1 ¡ t)wL ¡ U2l2(CL;1 ¡ L) = 0; (7)
@E[U]
@e
= ¡U1l1(1 ¡ e) + pe fE[U2(CHi;1 ¡ Hi)] ¡ U2(CL;1 ¡ L)g = 0:(8)
These ﬁrst order conditions (6)-(8) imply a block recursive system: optimal labor
supply H¤
i , L¤ and with it optimal consumption C¤
Hi, C¤
L are separately deﬁned
by (6) and (7) respective.11 Optimal consumption and labor supply of both skill
groups depend on the labor tax rate t, on the lump-sum transfer T and on the
respective wage rate wH, wL. Additionally, both the graduate tax rate tH and
skill-speciﬁc tuition fees fB are only relevant for labor supply and consumption
10We thereby assume that the government can credibly commit to its chosen tax instruments,
and we do not consider any hold-up and time-consistency problem. Moreover, we do not focus
on extortionary Leviathan governments. See Andersson and Konrad (2003b) for these issues in a
related context.
11Throughout the paper, asterisks denote optimal values. To simplify the notation, we drop the
functional arguments t;T;tH;fB;wH;wL when this causes no confusion.
11of skilled workers. Inserting optimal labor supply and consumption into the sec-
ond period utility function leads to the indirect (expected) utility function for both
types of workers: V H = E[U2(C¤
Hi;1 ¡ Hi
¤)], V L = U2(C¤
L;1 ¡ L
¤). Opti-
mal learning effort e¤ = e(t;T;tH;fB;E;wH;wL) is obtained by applying the
respective indirect utility functions V H and V L in (8). Evaluating ﬁrst period
utility at the optimal effort e¤ delivers the ﬁrst period indirect utility function
V = U(1¡e¤).
Given the properties of the utility functions stated in assumption 1 and the
block recursive form of the ﬁrst order conditions, it is sufﬁcient to check the sec-
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The inequality in equation (11) is given by decreasing marginal utility of leisure,
and decreasing marginal productivity of learning, and by the fact that a skilled
worker must have higher utility in the second period than an unskilled one,
V H > V L, because else there will be no learning effort at all.
In the next sections we derive the optimal policy mix. For that reason, we need
to derive some comparative statics of the individual choice variables with respect
to the different instruments. We start by calculating the comparative statics of
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U2CC(1 ¡ t ¡ tH)wHµi ¡ U2Cl2
SOC(Hi)
< 0; (13)
where we have assumed that leisure is a normal good. Hereby, it is less important
to disentangle income and substitution effects, but to show that (i) the effects of a
general wage tax and a graduate tax on skilled labor supply and (ii) the (income)
effects of the lump-sum transfer and skill-speciﬁc tuition fees are identical.
By the very same analysis we obtain comparative static results for learning









with ®j = @V j
@C > 0; j = H;L denoting the marginal utility of income. Assum-
ing agent monotonicity and the single crossing property (Mirrlees, 1976) to hold,
equation (14) always holds as strict inequality. These assumptions imply that a
skilled household always commands a higher (expected) income than an unskilled
worker, and hence E[®Hi] < ®L. The intuition is straightforward: any increase
in lump-sum income T decreases the learning intensity e, because an educational
degree gets marginally less attractive.













V H ¡ V L¢
SOC(e)
> 0: (16)
13Learning effort is unambiguously reduced if skill-speciﬁc tuition fees rise because
this directly reduces the returns to education and creates a negative substitution ef-
fect, whilst increased spending in education increases the productivity of learning,
and therefore learning effort.
A rise in graduate taxation will unambiguously reduce learning effort as well.
The intuition is analogous to the case of skill-speciﬁc tuition fees: a rise will







Contrary to these effects, the effect of an increase in the wage tax t is less clear.
Increasing ceteris paribus the tax burden on skilled wage income decreases learn-
ing effort, because the returns to schooling decrease. Increasing ceteris paribus
the wage tax for unskilled worker increases the returns to schooling and increases











Applying optimal household behavior in equation (5), we obtain the indirect
expected utility function of a household as
E[V ¤(t;T;tH;fB;E)] = V (t;T;tHfB;E) (19)
+ p(e¤;E) ¢ V H(t;T;tH;fB) + [1 ¡ p(e¤;E)] ¢ V L(t;T):
By using the envelope-theorem we can derive the marginal impact of a policy
change on the expected utility of a household, which will be helpful in deriving
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As both educational and wage risk are idiosyncratic, there is no risk in aggregate.
The government is faced by deterministic values due to the law of large num-
bers. Hence, from a policy maker’s perspective, there are [1 ¡ p(e¤;E)] unskilled
workers supplying (1 ¡ p¤) ¢ L¤ efﬁciency units of unskilled labor. Furthermore,
p(e¤;E) skilled workers supply p¤ ¢ E[µi ¢ H¤
i ] efﬁciency units of skilled labor.
Assuming a benevolent government, the aim is to maximize social welfare.
For this purpose, resources can be spent on education, determining the quality of
the education system, and a lump-sum transfer T can be granted to all households.
Moreover, welfare is determined by taxes and tuition fees, which are necessary in
order to ﬁnance overall expenditure E +T. Tax revenue is created by implement-
ing a proportional wage tax at rate t on all labor incomes, by usage of a graduate
tax at rate tH on skilled labor income and by skill-speciﬁc tuition fees fB.
Thus, the governmental budget constraint can be written as




H)wHE[µi ¢ Hi] + fB
ª
+ (1 ¡ p
¤) ¢ twLL: (25)
Formally, the maximization problem for social welfare E[V ¤(E;fB;t;T;tH)] can





H)] s.t. (25): (26)
Using E, the government can directly inﬂuence the percentage of skilled and
unskilled workers. Skill-speciﬁc tuition fees fB provide both insurance and efﬁ-
cient redistribution between these groups and affect indirectly the shares of skilled
and unskilled workers via incentives for learning effort. The wage tax t has anal-
ogous effects, but distorts labor supply. However, the wage tax has only a moder-
ate effect on learning effort and additionally redistributes income between skilled
households. Therefore, it provides an extended insurance effect. The graduate tax
tH has a similar impact: income ﬂuctuations in between skilled households are
reduced and the gap between skilled and unskilled labor income is narrowed – but
labor supply distortions are created only in the skilled sector (whereas it causes
more distortions in learning effort than a general wage tax).
Schindler and Weigert (2008) show in a similar setting, but without wage risk
in the skilled sector, that a wage tax is optimally not used. Skill-speciﬁc tuition
fees provide insurance and redistribution between skilled and unskilled workers at
lower costs, if they are combined with enhancing the quality of education. In the
present model, however, heterogeneity of skilled households calls also for redis-
tribution within the group of skilled. This should give support for labor taxation –
at least via graduate taxation of the skilled.
Thus, the questions emerging are now: (i) What is the optimal overall tax
burden on skilled labor income, if any? (ii) Is it – following Lipsey-Lancaster
intuition – optimal to tax and to distort unskilled labor supply as well? (iii) What
is the optimal combination of ex ante tuition fees, enhancing educational quality
and of ex post fees via graduate taxation, the latter being proportional to income?
(iv) What are the effects on public investment in education?
12Note that we are going to assume V H > V L to hold in order to ensure e¤ > 0. Thus, we
focus on interior solutions. There might be a corner solution else, restricting both governmental
instruments and maximum net taxes on skilled workers. Note as well that in any case a self-
selection constraint is not necessary due to the information set of the government.
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effects (20) – (24), where ¹ ®H = E[®Hi], where A = (t+tH)¢wH is the tax wedge
on skilled labor supply and where B = (t + tH) ¢ wHE[µi ¢ H¤
i ] + fB ¡ t ¢ wL ¢ L¤
represents the average net tax wedge on learning effort.
Relying on optimal household’s behavior and comparative statics, some ﬁrst
order conditions of the governmental optimization problem can be rearranged to
result in equations (32) and (33):13
t + tH
1 ¡ t ¡ tH =
·
¹ ®H











13See the Appendix for an explicit derivation of these expressions.
17where h(pe) = ¡
pee
pe > 0 as hazard rate determines, how fast marginal productiv-
ity of learning effort decreases, where h(p) =
p¤
e









i ] ¢E[SHH] > 0representsthe(expected)compensated(net)wage
elasticity of effective skilled labor supply and »(µ) = ¡Cov(®H;wH¢µi¢H¤
i )
¹ ®H¢wH¢E[µi¢H¤
i ] > 0
is the insurance characteristic, being deﬁned analogously to Feldstein’s distribu-
tional characteristic (see Feldstein, 1972). Therefore, »(µ) measures the concern
of the government for providing insurance against skilled wage risk.
t
1 ¡ t
¢ (1 ¡ p
¤) ¢ wLL
¤ ¢ ²LL = 0; (33)
where ²LL is the compensated (net) wage elasticity of unskilled labor supply.
Referring to equations (32) and (33), we can now infer the following conclu-
sions:
Proposition 1. Even if there is wage uncertainty for skilled workers and positive
labor taxation in the skilled sector, there will be no general labor taxation and
unskilledleisurechoiceremainsundistorted, aslongasthegovernmenthasaccess
to skill-speciﬁc tuition fees fB and unconstrained lump-sum transfers (uniform
tuition fees) T. Hence, t = 0.
Proof. Unconstrained lump-sum transfer implies that this transfer can turn into a
uniform tuition fee (lump-sum tax) T < 0, which has to be paid irrespectively
of being successful or not in educational investment. Applying then (33) and
recognizing the compensated elasticity ²LL as well as the wage bill of unskilled
workers to be positive, it must be t = 0.
A general wage tax is neither used to insure against any risk nor to provide
redistribution between households. Labor choice in the unskilled sector remains
undistorted, as there is no need for redistribution between unskilled workers.
With respect to the skilled sector, introducing wage and income risk for skilled
workers reanimates, however, the traditional income insurance via labor taxation
à la Eaton and Rosen (1980a,b) – but it is restricted to graduate taxation, which is
18only faced by the skilled. To show this, we make use of the following lemma:
Lemma 1. There is always a positive average net tax burden on education B =
(t + tH) ¢ wHE[µi ¢ H¤
i ] + fB ¡ t ¢ wL ¢ L¤ > 0. This also guarantees ®L > ¸.
Proof. See Appendix.
Then, we conclude from equation (32):
Proposition 2. In case of educational risk and wage risk in the skilled sector,
it is optimal to implement a positive graduate taxation tH > 0, which balances
insurance by reducing wage ﬂuctuations and efﬁciency losses caused by distorting
skilled labor supply.
Proof. The insurance characteristic is positive by deﬁnition, and so is the com-
pensated wage elasticity ²HH. The ratio between the insurance characteristic and
the wage elasticity in the second factor of the RHS in equation (32) mirrors the
trade-off between the insurance effect and distortions in labor supply.
In order to guarantee positive graduate taxation, the squared bracket on the
RHS of equation (32) must also be positive. Herein, the hazard rates h(p), h(pe)
and absolute risk aversion ARA(e) are deﬁned as positive values as are marginal
utility of (skilled) income, ¹ ®H, respectively marginal costs of tax revenue, ¸.
Moreover, V H > V L from household choice, ensuring e¤ > 0, and we have
B > 0 from Lemma 1. Consequently, the squared bracket is positive, and accord-
ingly tH > 0.
Positive graduate taxation achieves two aims:14 ex ante it reduces wage risk
for skilled workers, and ex post it narrows the income gap between the skilled and
the unskilled households, thus it implicitly provides redistribution. Distortions
in labor supply are balanced with reduced uncertainty and a welfare enhancing
insurance effect. Accordingly, this partial result is in line with standard models
featuring income risks and taxation (e.g., Eaton and Rosen (1980b), Hamilton
(1987), but also Anderberg and Andersson (2003)). If there is, instead, no wage
risk, the insurance characteristic »(µ) vanishes, and there is no need for distorting
14Negative graduate taxation would economically be senseless, anyway. Wage subsidies in-
crease income risk and cause efﬁciency losses via distortions, which cannot be optimal.
19taxation at all – consequently tH = 0 and we are back in the model and the results
in Schindler and Weigert (2008).
Efﬁciency losses due to distortions, measured as overall marginal costs of tax
revenue relative to pure income effects ¸ > ¹ ®H, have a dampening effect on
graduate taxation. Moreover, success in education plays a role in determining the
optimal wage tax rate. From equation (32) can be inferred: the more sensitive
marginal productivity of learning effort h(pe) is, the lower should the optimal tax
rate be, whereas a higher growth rate of the success probability h(p) allows for
higher taxation. Last but not least, attitudes towards risk in learning investment,
ARA(e), have a major impact.
The optimal tax rate tH in (32) decreases in absolute risk aversion in educa-
tional investment. This can be best rationalized under the standard assumption of
decreasing absolute risk aversion: The negative income effect of wage taxation in-
creases risk aversion ARA(e). Higher risk aversion then decreases learning effort
and, therefore, the success probability, i.e., quality of education. Accordingly,
Corollary 1. Assuming decreasing absolute risk aversion, high absolute risk
aversion in learning effort decreases ceteris paribus optimal graduate taxation,
in order to avoid negative (income) effects on the quality of education.
Proof. In case of decreasing absolute risk aversion, a wealth reduction by taxa-
tion increases risk aversion and decreases risky investment, here learning effort.
Hence, the negative relationship between ARA(e) and tH in equation (32) can be
interpreted as avoiding excessively negative risk effects of graduate taxation on
learning effort and the success probability.
In case of educational (failure) risk in graduating and wage risk within the
industries of the skilled sector, all distortions in labor supply are concentrated
among the skilled workers. This is amazing, because the result by Lipsey and
Lancaster (1956), stating the introduction of several distortions to be worth while
as long as the First-best cannot be reached, does still not apply. Intuitively, one
would expect the wage tax to be positive, t > 0, because it has the same effects
like graduate taxation with respect to wage risk, similar effects with respect to
educational risk and weighes induced distortions in unskilled labor supply against
20only moderate distortions in learning effort. Looking at the optimal tax structure,
however, it is still not optimal to introduce distortions in the unskilled sector,
although we have strong distortions in learning effort and in labor supplied in the
skilled sector, and though production efﬁciency cannot be guaranteed. The reason
for this result is that distortions in learning effort can be mitigated by enhancing
the quality of education, as will be shown later. The labor tax is then dominated
by combinations of the other instruments.
Put together, Propositions 1 and 2 imply:
Corollary 2. Although there are distortions in learning effort and skilled labor
supply, the Lipsey-Lancaster-theorem cannot be applied, because it is still not
optimal to distort unskilled labor supply, as t = 0. Thus, insuring the skilled
against wage risk can be seen as dichotomic task.
Turning to skill-speciﬁc tuition fees, it is, unfortunately, not possible to deter-
minethesignof fB ingeneral. Toshowthis, letusdeﬁnetheexpected(orfromthe
ex post view: the average) net social marginal value of income, including income
effects on the tax base, as



















where we have already used t = 0. Accordingly, the net social marginal valuation









Note that the only effect on the tax base is due to a change in the likelihood to get
skilled and to have to pay taxes on education, then.
It is straightforward from rearranging FOC (28) that the standard condition
¹ b = 1 (36)
has to hold true.





e < 0 as the compensated elasticity of
21learning effort with respect to skill-speciﬁc tuition fees. Reverting to equation








where bL ¡¹ b > 0 and where ²pe = e
p¤(e;E) ¢ p¤
e > 0 is the elasticity of the success
probability with respect to a change in learning effort.
Thus, optimal tax payments of the skilled for being successful in getting an
employment in the skilled sector weigh gains from redistribution15 against in-
duced distortions by skill-speciﬁc fees in learning effort (²efB) and how these
translate into a decrease in quality of education (²pe). The higher the gap be-
tween income valuation by the unskilled to the average valuation in society, the
higher net taxes on successful education will be. The more elastic learning effort
and the more sensitive the success probability are, the more excess burden will be
created and the less net taxes on successful education will be raised.
Relying on B = tH ¢ wH ¢ E[µi ¢ H¤
i ] + fB, the optimal skill-speciﬁc tuition







H ¢ wH ¢ E[µi ¢ H
¤
i ]: (38)
Skill-speciﬁc tuition fees, fB > 0, can be optimal as in Schindler and Weigert
(2008), however, it appears more likely that direct (education) subsidies are paid
out to the skilled. These would – analogously to the intuition in Bovenberg and
Jacobs(2005)andSchindlerandYang(2007)–ceterisparibusmitigatedistortions
in learning effort, caused by graduate taxation, and would transform risky labor
incomeindeterministictransfers. Thelatterthenexactlyﬁtstheinsurancestrategy
in Eaton and Rosen (1980a). Subsidies are, ceteris paribus, the more likely the
higher graduate taxation tH and the lower the overall tax burden on successful
education are.
However, potential subsidies fB < 0 cannot be larger than graduate tax rev-
enue collected from the skilled households, because it must be B > 0 from
15This redistribution is conducted by additional tax payments of the skilled and is measured
as the difference between the net social marginal valuation of income by the unskilled and the
average net social marginal value of income in the society.
22Lemma 1. Unskilled workers, therefore, do not take part in income insurance
of skilled workers, and there are still resources transferred from the skilled sector
to the educational sector in order to provide enhanced quality of education.
Optimal public investment E is obtained from rearranging FOC (31)
E¤ = p¤ ¢
·
²pE ¢





i ] + fB
¤
(²pE + ²pe ¢ ´eE)
¸
> 0; (39)
whereat ²pE = E
p¤(e;E) ¢ p¤
E > 0 is the elasticity of the success probability with
respect to a change in public spending for (the quality of) the education system,
E, and ´eE = E
e ¢ @e
@E > 0 is the elasticity of learning effort with respect to the
endowment of universities.
The second term on the RHS of equation (39) mirrors the increased impor-
tance of enhancing educational quality in a Second-best world. The call for
public real investment in the educational sector, due to welfare gains of increas-
ing the skilled population, is strengthened by positive net taxation of education,
B = tHwHE[µi ¢ H¤
i ] + fB > 0, having a negative substitution effect on learning
effort, and therefore, decreasing the success probability. Hence, it is important to
counter these distortions by increased public spending E.
Taken together the combination of graduate taxation and skill-speciﬁc tuition
fees, tH and fB, and public investment E allow once more for insurance against
educational (failure) risk and redistribution between skilled and unskilled workers
at lower costs than a general wage tax – and imply that stabilizing quality of
education plays an important role in a Second-best world.
Proposition 3. Optimal real investment in the educational sector E¤ > 0 ex-
ploits welfare gains from an increased share of skilled households and mitigates
distortions in learning effort, which are caused by the tax instruments tH and
f
B.
Thereby, the endowment of the educational sector E¤ and
(i) the skill premium V H ¡ V L,
(ii) the graduate wage tax rate tH,
(iii) and skill-speciﬁc tuition fees fB
23are strategic (ﬁscal) complements. Instead, marginal costs of tax revenue, ¸, and
public investment are strategic substitutes.
Closing the model, the optimal lump-sum transfer can be inferred from the
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Consequently, we can state:
Proposition 4. Some part of public expenditure is ﬁnanced by general tuition
fees T < 0, if the success probability for entering the skilled sector is sufﬁciently
elastic. Sufﬁcient conditions are:
(i) The success probability with respect to public spending is elastic, ²pE ¸ 1,
or
(ii) The combination of production and complementarity elasticities results in
²pE + ²pe ¢ ´eE > 1.
Proof. Proposition 4 follows directly from (41) and recognizing that V H > V L
as well as B = tH ¢ wH ¢ E[µi ¢ H¤
i ] + fB > 0 from Lemma 1.
Proposition 4 reproduces the central result in Schindler and Weigert (2008)
concerning direct income transfers to unskilled households. Given that the learn-
ing technology is not too inefﬁcient – meaning the optimal success probability
is not too inelastic – both skilled and unskilled workers have to pay for the edu-
cational sector by a uniform lump-sum tax, which can be interpreted as general
tuition fees, being not insured via skill-speciﬁc tuition fees.
Summarizing all our results, wage risks in the skilled sector are insured and
diversiﬁed only among the graduated by positive, labor supply distorting graduate
(wage) taxation and by skill-speciﬁc tuition fees. The latter can turn negative in
24ordertoprovideadeterministicincometransfer. Hence, directeducationsubsidies
for skilled workers, fB < 0, can be welfare maximizing. The unskilled sector is
neither affected by technological change nor by its social insurance policy.
Redistribution between skilled and unskilled households and insurance against
educational risk of failure at university are again provided by a combination of (a)
skill-speciﬁc tuition fees respectively a graduate tax, which together ensure that
the skilled pay more than the unskilled for the public educational investment, and
(b) public real investment into the educational sector. The former, (a), follows
at once from comparing the tax burdens of a skilled and an unskilled household:
tH wH µi H¤
i + fB ¡ T > ¡T > 0. The latter, (b), is invested in order to stabi-
lize and enhance the quality of education, i.e., the ‘ﬁlter technology’ by Konrad
(2004), and to increase the expected utility of every household from an ex ante
point of view.
Though there are distortions in skilled labor supply and though graduate and
generalwagetaxationareequivalentwithrespecttoeffectsonskilledlaborsupply,
there is no trade-off between distortions in skilled and unskilled labor supply.
The general wage tax is not used and the Lipsey-Lancaster theorem cannot be
applied. This non-mitigation of distortions in labor supplies is very amazing,
especially as it is not driven by production efﬁciency. The reason is that, ﬁrst, a
general wage tax is still inferior for insurance against the risk of failure and for
redistribution between the sectors, as long as there are both public investment into
the quality of the educational sector and tax instruments, being tailored to tax only
the skilled, available. Second, insuring wage risk is a dichotomic task, which can
be done sufﬁciently by combining graduate taxation and skill-speciﬁc tuition fees.
Distorting unskilled labor supply would not create any additional insurance effect,
but harm those part of the society, having the highest value in the social welfare
function.
Last, but not least, quality of education matters again more than direct income
insurance: we have general tuition fees (lump-sum taxes T < 0), which have to
be paid irrespectively of being successful or not, instead of direct income transfers
to the unskilled. These resources are used in order to improve the likelihood of
being successful - accordingly, for providing ex ante insurance.
Contrary to the case of deterministic wages, it can, however, happen (and it
25is very likely) that the “front-loaded” tuition fees get regressive. If the concern
for insurance is (very) high and the compensated wage elasticity is sufﬁciently
low in the skilled sector, graduate taxation becomes (very) high and skill-speciﬁc
tuition fees turn negative. Therefore, we end up with direct subsidies fB < 0.
Then, front-loaded fees are ¡T > 0 for the unskilled and fB ¡ T < ¡T for
the skilled. Admittedly, this regression is more than compensated by back-loaded
fees, namelygraduate taxation, which simultaneouslyfulﬁlls anincome-insurance
function. Put together, the net tax burden of skilled workers is still higher than the
one of the unskilled ones.
The regression result in tuition fees can back education policies, observed in
the real world: In the US, gifted students receive rebates in (or scholarships for)
their tuition fees. In Germany, successful and fast students receive rebates in their
fees or direct subsidies via ﬁnancial student aid (BAföG), because their credit
repayment obligations are decreased. Additionally, in both countries, there is at
least some progressive labor taxation, implementing ex post tuition fees via higher
marginal tax rates – according to our graduate taxation.
7 Conclusions
We examine the optimal tax and education policy to maximize social welfare in
case of (endogenous) risk of failure in education, being determined via learning
effort by the individuals, and of wage risk within the skilled sector, driven by
technological change.
We show that insuring against these risks is a dichotomic task: wage risk in
the skilled sector is diversiﬁed between all graduates by implementing a positive
graduate tax and granting education subsidies by skill-speciﬁc tuition fees. The
unskilled are not affected and their labor supply is not distorted by this task.
Insuring against educational risk of failure is implemented by an ex ante ap-
proach, focusing on quality of education. All households have to pay general tu-
ition fees (a general lump sum tax). These resources plus the positive net revenue
from graduate taxation are invested into the quality of the educational system.
This increases the success probability of each student and thereby increases its
expected utility – providing efﬁcient insurance.
26Taken together, we end up with a graduate tax, mirroring progressive income
taxation, but regressive tuition fees. Therefore, our results can provide a justi-
ﬁcation for real world tuition fee systems, where, e.g., in Germany, successful
students pay less ‘front-loaded’ fees per semester than drop-outs, because they re-
ceive direct rebates in their tuition fees or subsidies by favorable repayment rules
in student loans (i.e., BAföG). Nevertheless, these successful students still have




Applying Steiner’s rule, E[~ x ¢ ~ y] = E[~ x] ¢ E[~ y] + Cov(~ x; ~ y), in equation (30) and
inserting equation (27) therein, allows to cancel the direct effects. Rearranging






























Using the Slutsky decomposition and collecting income effects, we ﬁnd for
the ﬁrst term in squared brackets on the LHS
@(µi ¢ Hi)





= ¡SHH ¢ wH (43)
in which SHH > 0 represents the pure substitution effect of a change in the wage
rate wH onto effective skilled labor supply.
Moreover, recognizing the comparative static effects (17) and (15) and, again,















27by collecting terms. If we, furthermore, insert FOC (8) of the household into its

























where ARA(e) = ¡
U1l1l1
Ul1
> 0 equals absolute risk aversion in ﬁrst period leisure
respectively learning effort, and where h(pe) = ¡
pee
pe > 0 as hazard rate deter-
mines, how fast marginal productivity of learning effort decreases.
Inserting then the terms (43) – (45) in equation (42), we receive
p
¤ A ¢ E[¡SHH]wH = ¡
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0 as insurance characteristic in skilled labor income, rearranging and collecting
terms provide equation (32) as
t + tH
1 ¡ t ¡ tH =
·
¹ ®H


















Solving (27) for p¤ ¢ ¹ ®H and (30) for p¤E[®H ¢wHµiH¤], respectively solving (28)
for (1 ¡ p¤) ¢ ®L, we can substitute these expressions into the ﬁrst order condi-
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for the ﬁrst term in squared brackets.
Instead inserting the comparative static effects in learning effort, (14) – (15)















When we now substitute (48) and (49) into (47) and apply the Slutsky decompo-
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Proof of Lemma 1
Applying t = 0 from Proposition 1, B = tH ¢ wH ¢ E[µi ¢ H¤
i ] + fB represents the
net tax burden on learning effort. In order to show that B > 0, we use t = 0 in







equation (13), this leads to
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@T < 0, because of comparative static results in (15) and (14).
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29where pe > 0 by assumption,
@(µi¢Hi)
@fB > 0 from (13) and @e
@fB < 0 from (15).
Assume now B · 0, then it must hold ®L · ¸ from (50) and ¹ ®H > ¸ from
(51). This then implies ¹ ®H > ®L, which contradicts our assumption of agent
monotonicity. Hence, B · 0 cannot appear in an optimum.
Only if B > 0, there is support for ®L > ¹ ®H. Furthermore, in this case it
holds true from equation (50) that ®L > ¸.
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